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A Rationale for Captive Supplies
H. Alan Love and Diana M. Burton1
The academic and legal debate over the costs and benefits of vertical integration is both well known
and lengthy  (Perry 1989, Williamson 1989).  On one side, economists see firms’ decisions to vertically
integrate as nothing more than a means of reducing transactions costs, assuring supply, or as a means
of alleviating efficiency losses that result from under-utilization of resources (McGee and Bassett 1976;
Williamson 1975, 1985).  On the other side, economists see vertical integration as a means for firms to
reduce competition or extract market rents (Scherer 1980; Perry 1978a, 1989).  To date, most of the
discussion has focused on the effects of a monopolist integrating forward into a competitive downstream
intermediate product market.  Little work exists on the reverse case of a monopsonist integrating back-
ward into a competitive input market (Perry 1978b; McGee and Bassett 1976).  However, this case is
of growing importance in many agricultural and natural resource industries, including poultry processing,
beef processing, and forest industries.
In many industries, backward integration occurs either through acquiring input suppliers, estab-
lishing long-term contracts with existing suppliers, or investing in new input production capacity through
internal corporate growth.  In some industries, there is increasing concern about the effects of these
arrangements on the remaining unintegrated input suppliers.  Perhaps the most vocal are fed cattle
producers.  According to the Kiplinger Agriculture Letter:
[There is] plenty of grumbling about captive beef supplies these days . . . complaints that too
many cattle are tied up by the packers themselves, either through outright ownership or through
contractual arrangements.  Critics see the cattle industry heading down the poultry pathway:
highly integrated, with packers and processors controlling all aspects of production . . . from the
supply of feeders through slaughter and processing.  They point to intensified concentration of
the packing business and fret that the trend leaves [the] market vulnerable to price manipulation
(June 9, 1995).
These concerns are reflected in the recent decision by Congress to initiate a $500,000 study (through
USDA Packers and Stockyards Administration (PSA)) to investigate the effects of increasing packer
concentration in the red meat packing industry.  Seven projects were identified as priority research,
including studies on price determination in slaughter cattle procurement and the role of captive supplies
in the beef packing industry.
The Congressionally mandated Packers and Stockyards Administration study reports that, during
the April 5, 1992 to April 3, 1993 interval, the 43 largest steer and heifer slaughter plants procured 82
percent of cattle through the spot market, 8 percent of fed cattle through marketing agreements, and 7
percent through forward contracts.  The PSA study defined forward contracting as contracts to purchase
specific lots of cattle at any time from placement of cattle on feed up to two weeks prior to the kill date.
In contrast, marketing agreements were defined as long-term arrangements between a packer and a seller24
under which the packer agrees to purchase a specific number of cattle per specified time period (week,
month, year).  During the same 1992-1993 interval, the PSA study found packers obtained 3 percent of
fed cattle through custom feedlot arrangements or through wholly-owned feed lot operations where cattle
were packer-owned while they were fed for slaughter (p. 170).
Captive supplies in the beef industry are typically defined as “cattle owned by packers, forward con-
tracted by them, and/or formula-priced cattle bought by the packers” (Uvacek 1995).  This definition
includes both procurement and pricing methods.  A narrower definition of captive supplies, more closely
aligned with the concepts of vertical integration, includes cattle that are packer-owned or fed and cattle
procured through forward contracts or long-term marketing agreements (Ward 1990).  This definition
conforms more closely to the industrial organization tradition that defines an upstream or downstream
firm as vertically integrated if it controls either directly or indirectly the decisions made within the
vertical structure.  Thus, a firm can be backward integrated without actually owning its input suppliers.
Under this definition, vertically integrated profit is the maximum aggregate profit that the vertical
structure can obtain (Tirole 1988: 170).  In this paper, we follow this narrow definition, suggesting that
the PSA procurement categories packer-owned and marketing agreement most closely fit the model
developed below.
The PSA study found large firms are more likely to use marketing agreements and forward contracts
to purchase cattle than are other firms.  For example, Williams et al. (1996) report, “ConAgra, Excel,
and IBP account for 73 percent of spot market transactions, but 88 percent of marketing agreements and
95 percent of forward contract transactions” (p. 16).  They also found smaller firms in California and
Arizona accounted for 42 percent of packer-fed lots.  In another study of the Plains feeding area, Ward
(1990) found that IBP, ConAgra, and Excel accounted for 98 percent of cattle procured as captive
supplies during June 1989 (p. 31 ).
Many natural resource markets exhibit similar characteristics.  Typically, processing mills are spa-
tially distributed and transportation costs associated with moving raw products to mills are high, limiting
competition among natural resource buyers.  In the forest industry, large processing firms own or lease
vast tracts of timberland, but also purchase timber from outside suppliers.  In 1994, 31 forest products
firms in the U.S. and Canada owned 45 million acres of industrial timberlands and controlled another
162 million acres through lease arrangements with nonindustrial landowners who own no processing
facilities (Mies et al. 1994).  These holdings represent roughly 34 percent of total U.S. and Canadian
commercial-grade timberlands.  The remaining two-thirds of productive timberlands are owned and
controlled by either nonindustrial landowners or by governments.
Industrial owners internally supply a large proportion of their wood inputs.  In 1991, industrially-
owned forests in the U.S. accounted for 14 percent of timberland and 13 percent of timber inventory
volume, but supplied 33 percent of volume harvested (Powell et al. 1993).  Industrially-owned softwood
forests contain about 16 percent of total standing inventory volume, but accounted for 38 percent of
1991 softwood harvest volume.  The amount of wood internally supplied continues to increase.  Harvests
from U.S. industrial lands increased 6 percent between 1986 and 1991 and 62 percent between 1952 and
1991 (Powell et al. 1993).
In addition to harvesting from their own lands, forest products firms control additional acreage
through lease arrangements with nonindustrial private landowners.  These nonindustrial owners hold 59
percent of the timberland but only 46 percent of U.S. standing timber inventory volume (Powell et al.
1993).  These lands are typically less productive than industrially-owned forests.  The largest identifiable
group of nonindustrial landowners is farmers.  Ninety percent of nonindustrial landowners have less than
100 acres.
Some additional supply is provided by government.  These lands are owned by the federal govern-
ment, state governments, municipalities, and other public entities.  While publicly-owned forests in the
U.S. constitute 27 percent of the timberland and 41 percent of timber inventory volume (Powell et al.
1993), much acreage is reserved for parks, does not produce commercial timber, or is set aside for other25
uses.  Federal lands are primarily in the western U.S., while state and other public lands are in the
northeast and northcentral regions.  Harvesting from public lands is also dependent on a complex policy
structure and, in recent years, has not been a reliable or continuous source of timber in many regions.
In 1991, harvest from public lands represented only 18.5 percent of volume harvested.
Clearly, firms use various mechanisms to achieve backward integration into input markets.  There
is ample evidence, at least in the beef processing market, that large firms, more than small firms, use
these mechanisms to achieve at least partial backward integration.  In this paper, we develop one
plausible economic rationale for this behavior.  While in reality firms may use vertical integration for
a number of reasons, including achieving increased efficiency, reducing transactions costs, reducing price
risk or assuring supplies, we follow Perry (1978a) and focus on firms’ strategic use of vertical integra-
tion to achieve higher profits.
We utilize a number of simplifying assumptions.  First, we assume that a market is defined by a
dominant processing firm , a competitive fringe of smaller processors and competitive suppliers of a raw
input and that the number of firms is fixed.  Both processors’ output and the raw input are assumed
homogeneous.  These assumptions simplify analysis and are realistic in natural resource and agricultural
processing industries where firms possess scale economies over some range of operations and where
transportation costs associated with assembling the raw input are high.  Under these conditions,
processors have an incentive to be spatially distributed so that each firm dominates its local input market
area with distant firms in various directions representing a competitive fringe.  Second, we assume that
processors are competitive in their output markets.  This is reasonable when numerous firms dominating
their respective input supply areas compete in a homogeneous output market.  Third, we assume that
processing firms produce a single output employing a quasi-fixed proportions technology that allows
no substitution between the raw input and a vector of other production inputs.  This assumption allows
us to focus the analysis on the interaction of upstream and downstream firms in an input market and is
reasonable in natural resource or agricultural processing industries where final outputs contain specific
proportions of raw inputs.  Fourth, we assume the dominant firm enjoys falling average production costs
as output expands toward optimal capacity utilization.  As output rises above the optimum, average cost
rises.  This assumption is consistent with a short- or intermediate-run model of an agricultural or natural
resource processing industry where capital costs are high and where plant capacity is fixed.
Using these assumptions, we demonstrate both graphically and analytically some important impli-
cations of backward integration that may be achieved through vertically controlling a portion of the raw
input production sector either through establishing long-term exclusive contracts with raw input
suppliers or through acquiring upstream firms.  Contrary to the competitive notion that vertical integra-
tion is a purely “internal affair” that does not affect third parties (Tirole 1988: 170), we find that
processors who integrate backward into their input supply industries can potentially benefit from at least
two sources of increased profitability.  First, a backward integrated dominant firm benefits from
efficiency gains of expanded production.  Second, partial backward integration may result in a reduction
in the dominant firm’s acquisition price for externally supplied raw inputs.  We also show a number of
important comparative statics results relating to backward integration.
The Model:  A Graphical Approach
Consider a market with identical competitive input suppliers and a downstream processing industry
characterized by a dominant firm and a competitive fringe.  Total upstream market supply is x  = x ss
(w ), where w  is market price.  Without backward integration into the input producing sector, the mm
dominant processing firm acts as a price leader in purchasing input quantity x .  Acting as price takers, m
fringe processing firms follow by setting their optimal input levels so that aggregate fringe input demand
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This market situation is depicted in Figure 2.1.  The left quadrant presents upstream aggregate
supply x  = x (w ) and fringe processors’ aggregate demand x  = x (w ).  The residual supply facing ss m dd m
the dominant processor is shown in the right quadrant as x  = x (w ) = x (w ) - x (w ).  In the absence rs rs m s m d m
of vertical control, the dominant firm acts as a monopsonist with respect to residual supply, maximizing
profit by setting value marginal product for raw input x, VMP , equal to marginal outlay for that input, x
MO .  In Figure 2.1, this occurs at quantity x  and price w . rs m m
mm
At the monopsony solution defined in Figure 2.1, the dominant firm underemploys the raw input.
Assuming a constant raw input price, the firm could reduce average cost per unit of output by expanding
production.  However, unless the firm is able to price discriminate among input suppliers, this alternative
is not profitable.  Without price discrimination, the dominant firm must pay input suppliers a higher price
for all units purchased to expand output, wiping out cost savings from increased production.  However,
by backward integrating into its input market at least partially, the dominant firm can increase production
to achieve both increased technical efficiency and higher profits.
The dominant firm can achieve backward integration either through acquiring a fraction of the
upstream firms in the raw input industry or by entering into exclusive long-term contracts with input
suppliers who control a portion of total supply.  For the moment, assume that integration is achieved
through acquisition.  Suppose the dominant firm purchases fraction " of raw input suppliers so that it
internally produces amount x  of the raw input.  It then purchases quantity x  from the spot market.  In cm
this case, the dominant firm is able to segment its input market, internally supplying raw input at one
transfer price and externally purchasing raw input in the spot market at another price.  In the right
quadrant of Figure 2.1 the dominant firm’s internal supply (marginal cost) of raw input is given as xc
= " x (w ) and its residual spot market supply is given as  sc
where w  is the internal transfer price the dominant firm “pays” its internal input supply subsidiary.  To c
maximize profit, the dominant firm will continue to act as a monopsonist with respect to its external
residual input supply, but now it will operate its internal raw input producing facilities at the quantity
that equates VMP  to the marginal factor cost of the raw input, i.e.,   (Perry x
1978b).  With partial integration in the input market, the dominant firm will set total raw input use to
equate its marginal outlay for externally purchased input plus marginal factor cost for self-produced
input,   in Figure 2.1, equal to VMP .  To achieve this result, the dominant firm chooses the x
amount of input produced internally, x , and the price it pays in the spot market,  .  Total input c
quantity for the dominant firm is x  = x  + (1-")x (w ) - x (w ).  In Figure 2.1, optimal total input use t c sm dm
is  , with quantity   purchased in the spot market and quantity   produced internally.  Equilibrium
spot market price is now given by   and the internally supplied raw input transfer price is  .  As a
result of backward integration, total input use has expanded from   to   and the equilibrium spot
market input price has fallen from   to  .
The dominant firm reaps two benefits from partial backward integration into its input market.  First,
it benefits from efficiency gains of expanded production.  In Figure 2.1, this gain is measured as area
abcd under the dominant firm’s input demand function for x.  Second, the dominant firm benefits (in this
particular example) from paying a lower market price for externally supplied raw input.  This gain is
given by area efgh in Figure 2.1.  That is, partial backward integration results in a reduction in the price
for external raw input purchases amounting to  .  This benefit is case specific and depends,
among other things, on the slope of the dominant firm’s input demand for x (the slope of VMP ).  If, for x
example, the dominant firm’s input demand was flatter near the equilibrium point (input price  , input
quantity  ), then the equilibrium dominant firm monopsony price   would be less than the equi-
librium external input price  .  In this case, the dominant firm would suffer a loss from having to pay
a higher price for externally supplied inputs after backward integration.
To obtain these benefits, the dominant firm must bear additional costs.  The integrated firm produces
 of raw input internally.  Total variable cost of this production is area ijk.  However, the costs to the




























FIGURE 2.1  Economics of Vertical Integrationy ’ min (x/$,f( z ,k )),
C(y,w,v;k) ’ y$w % c(y,v;k) % FC ,
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related to rents accruing to input suppliers before they are purchased.  There are many possibilities, but
for simplicity, we follow Perry (1978b) and assume that any fraction of upstream firms can be acquired
by paying them the present value of the stream of per-period initial rents so that acquired suppliers are
never paid less for input x than they would have earned before being acquired.  In Figure 2.1, this
amounts to paying the acquired suppliers the equivalent of area enk at each time period.  Hence, per
period total cost of internal production is given by area enijk.  This is the same payment that would be
required for input purchases made through establishing exclusive supply contracts when the dominant
firm has perfect information about upstream firms’ production costs and when the dominant firm does
not in any way act as a “predator” in forming long-term contracts.  Before acquisition, the dominant firm
incurred external input costs of area enok for input production that becomes internalized in the vertically
integrated firm.  Hence, the net increase in input costs after integration is area nijo.  On balance, the total
benefit from backward integration is area abcd plus area efgh minus area nijo.  The net benefit is also
given by the sum of area efgh and area abu.
While we assume that the number of fringe firms is fixed, it is possible to draw some conclusions
about the effects of price changes resulting from vertical integration on the profitability and behavior of
fringe processors.  In the case where backward integration results in an equilibrium external input price
that is lower than the pre-integration input price, fringe processing firms’ profitability rises, creating an
incentive for the fringe to expand operations.  Fringe firm expansion will place competitive pressure on
the dominant firm, and may ultimately result in lost market share for the dominant firm.  Alternatively,
when backward integration results in a higher equilibrium external input price, this creates an unfavor-
able economic environment for fringe processors.  In this case, backward integration could be used as
a means of rasing rivals’ costs to allow the dominant firm to capture a larger market share (Perry 1978b).
Mathematical Model
The rest of this paper provides a brief formal analysis of backward integration.  As discussed above,
we assume that the dominant firm produces a single output, y, employing a quasi-fixed production
technology that does not allow substitution between input x and other inputs z and capacity k, but does
allow substitution among inputs other than x.  Further, we assume that the dominant firm’s plant size
k is fixed in the short run, so that cost is conditional on plant size.
This technology is given by:
(1)
where 1/$ represents the x to y conversion ratio, k is quantity of capital, z is a vector of input quantities
other than x and k, and f(z, k) is concave with positive and declining marginal products for capital k and
all remaining inputs z (Sexton 1990).  Cost minimization requires y = x/$ = f(z,k).  The cost function
for this technology is:
(2)
where w is the price of raw input x, v is a vector of variable input prices associated with z, and FC is
fixed costs.  The first term represents raw input costs and c(y,v;k) represents costs of all remaining
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For now, we set aside the long-run problem of determining the optimal degree of backward inte-
gration.  Instead, we concentrate on the short-run problem of determining the optimal quantity of raw
input to produce internally and the optimal price to set in the unintegrated upstream spot market given
that the dominant firm integrates with a portion " of the upstream industry.  To maximize short-run
vertically integrated profit, the dominant firm must maximize the joint profit of its processing and raw
input producing operations.  This is achieved by acting as a monopsonist with respect to its upstream
spot market residual supply and operating its internal input supply unit according to the competitive rule
of choosing internal input production so that marginal benefit equals marginal cost (Perry 1978b).  Total
variable cost of internal input production is given by:
(4)
where   is the inverse supply function for the fraction of input supply produced internally and
x  is the amount produced internally.  Fixed costs for these inputs are FC .  The dominant firm’s output c c
expressed in terms of input x is  .
Given these definitions, the dominant firm’s profit is:
(5)
The first term is revenue from output sales, the second term is externally supplied input cost, the third
term is internally supplied input cost, the fourth term is other input costs conditional on k, and the fifth




where cN(.) is the derivative of c(.) with respect to total input quantity x.
Interpreting equation (6), the dominant firm sets raw input price to equate VMP  (= p/$ - cN(.)/$) x
with its marginal outlay for externally purchased input MO  (= w (1 + (1/, )), where ,  is the price rs m rs rs
elasticity of residual supply).  Interpreting equation (7), the dominant firm sets internal raw input produc-
tion to equate VMP  with its internal marginal cost of input production.  If vertical integration is x
achieved only through long-term contracting, then equation (7) gives the optimal contract quantity, given
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where   is the optimal contract quantity,   is the equilibrium price in the external input market, and
* is a small constant.  From equation (8), it is apparent that when vertical control is established through
long-term contracts, the equilibrium contract price will be higher than the external spot market price.
It is instructive to contrast the dominant firm/competitive fringe solutions with and without back-
ward integration.  Solving equation (6) for   gives:
(9)
where   is value marginal product evaluated at   and   is the residual supply curve elasticity
with contracting.  With no contracting, this relationship is:
(10)
The external spot market price under partial contracting can be compared with the spot market price in
the case of no contracting:
(11)
Since a processor executing long-term contracts does not act as a monopsonist with respect to its con-
tractors, the presence of contracts for inputs will expand the dominant processor’s use of input x (Perry
1978b).  Then   <   because the value marginal product curve is downward sloping.
Therefore, the ratio of marginal value products in equation (11) is less than one, and if   =  , then 
will be less than one.  However, there is no reason to believe that   will equal   because   depends
on the degree of backward integration and both   and   depend on equilibrium spot market supply
and demand quantities.  While contracting expands the dominant firm’s use of input x, it is not clear
exactly how the elasticities of residual demand are affected.  However, if x , x , , , and ,  are assumed sds d
constant, then increased contracting results in lower values of  .  Under these rigid assump-
tions, the price ratio   rises with increased backward integration.  However, as the proportion of
contracting rises, the quantities supplied and demanded in the market will almost certainly change.  Even
so, it is possible to draw some conclusions concerning the external spot market price differential with
and without integration.  The spot market price, with partial backward integration, will be less than,
equal to, or greater than the unintegrated spot market price when the ratio   is less than,
equal to, or greater than the ratio  .
Comparative Statics Results
To better understand the effects of exogenous factors on the dominant firm’s decision to backward
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for analysis:  elasticity of total market supply  , elasticity of demand from fringe processors  , amount
of the dominant firm’s capital k, and proportion of suppliers with which the dominant firm contracts, ".
In this short-run analysis, both capital k and the degree of backward integration " are taken as given.
First, consider the effect of exogenous factors on the external market price w .  Three unambiguous m
results can be obtained.  Equation (12) gives the effect of a change in the elasticity of total supply on
external input market price:
(12)
where cO(.) indicates the second derivative of c(.) with respect to input x and *H* indicates the deter-
minant of the Hessian matrix.  As supply becomes more elastic, it becomes more costly for the dominant
firm to use its market power to depress the price of the raw input in the external market.  Hence, as the
elasticity of supply rises, so does the equilibrium external input market price.
Equation (13) shows that as the elasticity of demand from the fringe processors increases, the spot
market price falls:
(13)
As ,  rises, the absolute value,  , falls.  Hence, is  positive and a more elastic fringe d
demand makes it more costly for the dominant firm to exert market power.
Equation (14) shows that as the dominant firm’s production capacity increases, the external spot
market input price rises:
(14)
Clearly, as its output capacity expands, the dominant firm demands more of the raw input and the price
it must pay for this input rises.
Equation (15) shows the effect of an increase in the proportion of firms receiving contracts " on the
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In particular, the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of total supply and demand can change the sign
of the derivative.
Comparative static results for x , the quantity of internally supplied raw input, are similar to those c
for w .  Equation (16) shows that an increase in the elasticity of total supply results in a downward m
adjustment in internal input production:
(16)       
As supply becomes more elastic, it becomes less costly to expand input use in the external spot market
since increasing use will result in a smaller price rise.  In addition, with more elastic supply, it is more
costly for the dominant firm to exploit market power and the external market price-reducing effect of
backward integration becomes smaller.  Hence, there is less incentive for the dominant firm to engage
in backward integration.
Equation (17) indicates the dominant firm’s optimal internal input production increases as the
elasticity of fringe demand rises.  As ,  rises,  falls, and the residual supply curve becomes more d
inelastic.  Hence,  is negative and the dominant firm finds it profitable to decrease internal
supply x : c
(17)       
Equation (18) shows that as the dominant firm’s output capacity expands, it will produce a larger
quantity of raw input internally:
(18)
Increasing capacity raises total raw input demand, part of which is satisfied through increased internal
input production.
The comparative statics result for a change in " is ambiguous.  Equation (19) indicates that the mag-
nitude of a number of terms will change the sign.  The relative magnitudes of the elasticities of total
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The comparative static results are summarized in Table 2.1.  A rise in the supply elasticity will
reduce the amount of the factor internally produced and raise spot market factor price.  As supply
becomes more elastic, it becomes less costly to expand input use in the external spot market since
increasing use will result in a smaller price rise.  In addition, with more elastic supply, it is more costly
for the dominant firm to exploit market power and the external market price-reducing effect of backward
integration becomes smaller.  Hence, there is less incentive for the dominant firm to engage in backward
integration.
A rise in the absolute value of fringe demand elasticity will similarly raise spot market price and
lower the quantity of internally produced input.  A more elastic fringe demand makes it more costly for
the dominant firm to exert market power through vertical integration because increased internal input
production results in lost market input market share for the dominant firm.  As fringe demand becomes
TABLE 2.1  Summary of Comparative Statics Results
Exogenous Variable w x
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more elastic, it is profitable for the dominant firm to lower internal supply and purchase more on the spot
market.
Increasing production capacity will cause both the spot price and internally produced supply to grow.
Increasing capacity raises total raw input demand, part of which is satisfied through increased internal
input production with the remainder coming from the spot market.  Increased demand in the spot market
raises price.
Determining the Optimal Backward Integration
In the above short-run model, the proportion of vertically integrated suppliers is exogenous.  In the
long-run, " is a choice variable, set to maximize profits.  Applying the envelope theorem, the optimal
choice for " solves:
(20)
which can be rewritten as
(21)
Multiplying the RHS of equation (21) by " and rearranging results in
(22)
The left-hand side of equation (22) is VMP  less external spot market price, or profit from the dominant x
firm’s use of a unit of raw input purchased in the external spot market times the contract input supply
function evaluated at the equilibrium spot market price.  This term represents the economic rent achieved
by purchasing input in the spot market that the dominant firm could have produced internally.  The first
term on the RHS of equation (22) is the value to the firm of internally produced input, the second term
is the negative of total variable cost of producing internal input, and the third term is the negative of
incremental fixed costs incurred by contracting.  Hence, the right-hand side gives the dominant firm’s
producer surplus from producing input internally net of incremental fixed costs associated with produc-
ing additional input internally.  The firm chooses optimal " to equate the profit from external supply,
gained through exertion of monopsony market power, with the profit, or increase in producer surplus net
of contracting or acquisition costs from internally producing raw input.
Under the model assumption that integrated input suppliers, those under contract or purchased by
the dominant firm, are paid the present value of the stream of per period initial rents, the dominant35
processing firm will not fully backward integrate so long as its residual spot market input supply is
upward sloping and its VMP  curve is downward sloping.  A fully integrated dominant firm utilizes input x
to equate internal VMP  with internal marginal factor cost.  However, if residual supply is upward x
sloping, by reducing " the firm can make a positive profit by acting as a monopsonist with respect to its
residual supply.  Hence, the dominant firm will not fully backward integrate into its input market as long
as the monopsony profits to be made from external input purchases are larger than the lost efficiency
gains from internal production less the cost of purchasing the capacity required to achieve those gains.
On the other extreme, the dominant firm will backward integrate until increased output production
efficiency gains plus increased profits from monopsony power exertion equal the cost of obtaining
increased internal input production capacity.  The firm will backward integrate until the economic rents
from purchasing input in the spot market which could have been produced internally equate with the
producer surplus from internal input production net of incremental capacity costs.
Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrate both graphically and analytically some important implications of a
dominant processing firm’s backward integration into its input supply industry.  Contrary to the competi-
tive view that vertical integration does not have effects external to the integrated firm, we find that
backward integration has a number of important market effects.  First, with backward integration, a
dominant firm can potentially benefit from efficiency gains of expanded output and from a price reduc-
tion for its externally purchased inputs.  Second, when the dominant firm partially integrates through
long-term contracting, its contract price will be higher than the equilibrium external spot market price
for inputs.  Third, when the dominant firm backward integrates, the price that it pays for externally
purchased inputs can be higher, lower or equal to the price it would have paid had it not integrated,
depending on the effect that integration has on its elasticity of input demand and on its residual supply
elasticity.
Comparative statics analysis reveals several important implications of backward integration.  First,
we find that an increase in the residual supply elasticity results in an increase in the external spot market
price and a decrease in the quantity that an integrated dominant firm will produce internally.  Second,
an increase in the dominant firm’s output capacity results in increases in both the input spot market price
and the integrated firm’s internally produced input quantity.  Third, we find that as the dominant firm
increases its backward integration, the effects on spot market price and internally produced input
quantity are ambiguous.
Lastly, we investigate the dominant firm’s backward integration choice.  We find that the optimal
degree of integration results when benefits from adjusting residual spot market supply just offset
increased internal input production costs.
Many of the results of this model are consistent with empirical relationships uncovered in the recent
PSA studies of the red meat packing industry.  For example, Williams et al. (1996) and Ward et al.
(1996) find that beef processors paid higher prices for cattle procured through marketing agreements
than for cattle purchased in the spot market; that higher rates of capacity utilization are associated with
increased use of captive supplies; and that larger plants paid more for fed cattle than smaller plants.
Each of these results is predicted by our analysis.  Furthermore, Williams et al. find that cattle procured
from distant locations are less likely to be packer fed or to originate through marketing agreements.  A
characteristic of spatial models is that, as distance from the processing plant increases, the plant’s input
supply elasticity grows.  Processors’ reduced use of captive supplies as an input source as distance rises
is consistent with the prediction from our analysis that the quantity of internally supplied raw input falls
as the input supply elasticity rises.  Williams et al. (1996) also find that packer fed arrangements are
more likely where regional concentration is high.  From an individual firm’s perspective, higher regional36
concentration means a lower residual supply elasticity.  Hence, this finding is also consistent with the
prediction from our analysis that as the input supply elasticity rises, quantity of internally supplied raw
input falls.
While this analysis does not incorporate the dynamics inherent in natural resources such as timber,
many of our results are applicable to these markets.  Whether depressing spot market timber prices
within a mill’s buying area, or timbershed, is part of the motivation for forest products companies to own
timber is, of course, not known.  Our results simply illustrate that dominant firms’ backward integration
into their input markets can have important effects on market participants external to the integrated firm.
Note
 H. Alan Love is an associate professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Diana 1
M. Burton is an assistant professor in the Department of Forest Science at Texas A&M University,
College Station, Texas 77843-2124.  This manuscript reports work supported by the Texas Agricultural
Experiment Station.  Thanks to C. Richard Shumway for helpful comments.
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